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Measuring Government Effort to Respect Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

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Abstract

There exist a great number of measurement projects intended to benchmark the human condition as it relates to aspirations of human dignity. One thing these efforts have in common is that they are indicators of outcomes, or records of events. Measuring outcomes is methodologically appropriate and substantively useful for a great variety of purposes. Further, some data projects include measures of legal guarantees, as well, to provide some proxy indicator of a state's intentions often to be matched with the outcomes indicators to show gaps in law and practice as well as to examine limitations in a state's capacity to enforce law. However, the current attention being paid to economic human rights, or development rights, provides a distinct measurement challenge, as prevailing international law tasks states to do the best possible given extant resources. This is part of the framework of "progressive realization" of rights. Thus, outcomes measures of economic rights, typically based on wealth, are unfair to poorer states, by definition. In this paper, we propose a measurement of state effort to respect economic rights given available resources. We feel this substantively matches the progressive realization framework and alleviates the inequity of existing measures that are almost perfectly correlated with national wealth. As a demonstration, we produce effort scores for 100+ countries for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. We also provide a simple examination of some possible associates of government effort to respect these rights.

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INTRODUCTION

There exist a great number of measurement projects intended to benchmark the human condition as it relates to aspirations of human dignity. One thing these efforts have in common is that they are indicators of outcomes, or records of events. Measuring outcomes is methodologically appropriate and substantively useful for a great variety of purposes. Further, some data projects include measures of legal guarantees, as well, to provide some proxy indicator of a state's intentions – often to be matched with the outcomes indicators to show gaps in law and practice as well as to examine limitations in a state's capacity to enforce law. However, the current attention being paid to economic human rights, or development rights, provides a distinct measurement challenge, as prevailing international law tasks states to do the best possible given extant resources. This is part of the framework of "progressive realization" of rights. Thus, outcomes measures of economic rights, typically based on wealth, are unfair to poorer states, by definition. In this paper, we propose a measurement of state *effort* to respect economic rights given available resources. We feel this substantively matches the progressive realization framework and alleviates the inequity of existing measures that are almost perfectly correlated with national wealth. As a demonstration, we produce effort scores for 100+ countries for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. We also provide a simple examination of some possible associates of government effort to respect these rights.

BACKGROUND, FRAMEWORK, AND CONCEPT

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Brief Introduction

Approximately three-quarters of the world's sovereign states have made a formal commitment to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights through ratification of *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR)(1966).[1] The ICESCR is a legal formalization of the aspirations set out in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR)(1948). This treaty establishes the rights of persons to "freely determine their political status" (Article 1), "gain

[1] As of 3/10/09, the number of state parties was 160 (http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=321&chapter=4&lang=en).

his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts" (Article 6), receive equal pay for equal work (Article 7), form and join trade unions (Article 8), enjoy "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" (Article 12), receive a primary education and have access to free secondary education (Article 13), and to "enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications" (Article 14), among many others.

Like all human rights treaties, the rights contained within the ICESCR are means to the end of a life of human dignity. They are established as universal, meaning that they apply to all persons, in all times, and in all places.[2] While it should be noted that moral/cultural relativists dispute the feasibility of a truly universal conception of human dignity it is, by our reading, incontrovertible that the positive law legal instruments forming the international human rights regime -- such as the ICESCR, *the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR)(1966), *The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW)(1979), *The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (UNCAT)(1984), among many others -- create a binding universal vision of human dignity. This is so via both the ratification of individual states of these instruments and their content constituting international common law (Lauren 2003; Forsythe 2006).

The framework in which respect for economic, social, and cultural human rights are examined in this paper, which comes chiefly via their positive-law status but with recognition that these positive codes spring from a universal conception of morality, is known as soft-positivism (Richards and Gelleny 2007, 856).[3] That is, positive law makes these rights enforceable, but their moral universality makes them right to enforce.

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[2] The exception to this is when a state is under a declared state of emergency. In such cases, only a handful of rights are considered "non-derogable" and government respect others may be suspended in the interest of preserving stability.

[3] By "positive" we mean as part of positive laws and not as being "positive rights" in the sense that respect for these rights requires assertive action. Indeed, Donnelly (2003, 30-31), cleanly dispatches the false dichotomy created by the "positive rights vs. negative rights" framework and used by those such as Cranston (1964).

Longstanding arguments about universality notwithstanding, there seems to be some evidence on behalf of the universality of economic, social, and cultural rights. For example, Ishay finds a cross-cultural tapestry of concern for economic and social justice, including Hammurabi's Code, early Islamic thought, and "Plato's communist vision of economic redistribution" (2004, 35-40). Lauren (2003) adds the 1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XXIII, which asserted:

> The first concern of all is to save the poor workers from the cruelty of grasping speculators, who use human beings as mere instruments for making money. It is neither justice nor humanity so to grind men down with excessive labor as to stupefy their minds and wear out their bodies [and therefore, human rights] must be religiously respected…[and] wage-earners, who are, undoubtedly, among the weak and necessitous, should be specially cared for and protected by the commonwealth (57).

The Dichotomy: Political/Civil Rights vs. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Despite a historical tapestry of concern for the respect of these rights, in the modern human rights era (post-WWII), they have taken a back seat to civil and political rights. While, conceptually, human rights are interdependent and their respect is mutually reinforcing, the politics of the post-WWII era produced a dichotomous environment where sides were taken in an either/or-style standoff. Seen through the zero-sum lens of Cold War ideological rhetoric/logic, the West was seen as the champion of civil and political rights, while the East (and developing world) was seen as favoring economic, social, and cultural rights.

This split was seen in the behavior of states, starting during the drafting of the UDHR itself, with the United States accusing the Soviet Union of repressing dissent and the Soviets accusing the Americans of "crushing basic economic and social rights" (Lauren 2003, 220). This split carried over to the drafting of the separate ICCPR and ICESCR treaties in 1966, allowing states to choose their side in the fight.

During the administration of Jimmy Carter, the United States Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* included a section on "Government Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care, and Education". However, this section was dropped in the first *Country Reports* issued by the Reagan administration, with the following explanation:

> The urgency and moral seriousness of the need to eliminate starvation and poverty from the world are unquestionable, and continue to motivate large American foreign aid efforts. However, the idea of economic and social rights is easily abused by repressive governments which claim that they promote human rights even though they deny their citizens the basic rights to the integrity of the person, as well as civil and political rights. This justification for repressions has in fact been extensively used. No category of rights should be allowed to become an excuse for the denial of other rights. For this reason, the term economic and social rights is, for the most part, not used in this year's Reports (United States Department of State 1981, introduction).

The United States signed the ICESCR in 1977, in the first year of the Carter administration, but has yet to ratify the treaty. The dominance of Western writers among those prominently advocating universalism even went as far as pejoratively naming economic rights "second-generation rights" and "red rights", whereas civil and political rights were "first-generation rights" or "blue rights". The Cold War ideology is particularly transparent in associating economic rights with the color red, also associated with communist ideology.

This Cold War framework was not only evidenced in the behavior of states, however. Cingranelli and Richards (2007) demonstrate that major international human rights nongovernmental organizations such Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are latecomers in paying attention to economic, social, and cultural rights. Amnesty International, having focused almost exclusively in the past on physical integrity violations (torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, political imprisonment) and freedom of expression, has moved to an "'integrated human rights approach' that reflects a belief in the complementarity, universality and indivisibility of all rights" (216).

However, Amnesty's extremely influential annual world human rights report still severely marginalizes rights other than physical integrity rights. Economic, social, and cultural rights rights may show up in the small "Children's rights" section of the entry on Haiti or the "Economic, social and cultural rights" section of the entry on India. While we did not do a complete assessment of the 2008 world report, a sampling of approximately 30 country entries from the African, Asia/Pacific, and Latin American regions leads us to guess that economic, social, and cultural rights are featured in ten percent of the country entries, maximum. This attention is far greater, however, than what we'd estimate for Human Rights Watch's 2008 annual world report. Here, economic, social, and cultural rights are chiefly discussed in rare sections on women's rights or in sections on HIV/AIDS prevalence.

Development Goals or Economic, Social, and Cultural Human Rights? Both?

The current lack of focus on economic, social, and cultural rights is surprising in this era of attention to the United Nations' (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). According to the UN Secretary-General BAN Ki-Moon, the MDGs

> …set timebound targets, by which progress in reducing income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter and exclusion — while promoting gender equality, health, education and environmental sustainability — can be measured. They also embody basic human rights — the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter and security. The Goals are ambitious but feasible and, together with the comprehensive United Nations development agenda, set the course for the world's efforts to alleviate extreme poverty by 2015 (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml).

Some might place the blame for the inability of the MDG framework to motivate more attention to these rights at the feet of the divide between "development" and "human rights". Many see the "development" and "human rights" frameworks as distinct (Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer, and Randolph 2008). Yet, what are commonly called "development goals" are merely policies designed to implement respect for legally-established economic, social, and cultural rights. We see any distinction as unhelpful artifice. “Development” issues are human rights issues, and vice versa. Development goals and policies are designed to move beneficiaries and newly-empowered persons towards lives of greater dignity. The conception of dignity that drives these development policies is constructed by the extant regime of positive international human rights law.

Read in the most concrete manner, “development” aspires to the same vision of human dignity as does “human rights”, vis-à-vis economic, social, and cultural human rights. The United Nations Development Programme states unequivocally that the MDGs and human rights

> …share guiding principles such as participation, empowerment, national ownership; they serve as tools for reporting processes that can hold governments accountable; and, most fundamentally, they share the ultimate objective of promoting human well-being and honouring the inherent dignity of all people (UNDP 2007, 10).

Further, Article 1 of the UN *Declaration on the Right to Development* (1986) states that "the right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." Quite frankly, it is time to move past the language of interdependence and fully conceptually integrate the development and human rights frameworks.

Despite some movement towards integration, however, these documents still persist in maintaining that important differences exist between development and human rights. The UNDP (2007, 12) makes several arguments in this vein, all of which we reject. First, UNDP argues that “human rights are wider in scope”. By this same logic, however, one could argue that physical integrity rights are different from human rights because that category of means towards overall dignity does not cover all human rights. Second, UNDP argues that “human rights target all countries” while development goals apply only to developing countries. Yet, every country in the world could use improvement in equality of access to healthcare, education, clean water, food, medicine, work, and a host of other development rights. The United States of America could use no improvement in these regards? It has no room to develop?

Third, UNDP (2007, 12) argues that “human rights are legally binding and formal” while MDGs are recommendations. This is based on a narrow view of MDGs as representing nothing more than a set of policy recommendations, and not a conception of dignity. The MDG’s aspirations are covered under economic, social, and cultural rights in international human rights law. How could a set of policy recommendations to fulfill this aspect of dignity be divorced from a human rights framework? Oddly, in Table 1, the UNDP matches all the MDGs with their corresponding legal bases in international human rights law. For example, the goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger is grounded in Article 25(1) of the UDHR and Article 11 of the ICESCR. Fourth, it is asserted that development goals are different from human rights because MDGs have deadlines. Again, this is not a conceptual issue, but rather a narrow reading of MDGs as merely a particular set of policies. Finally, it is argued that MDGs are more-easily measured than are human rights. Again, this is a practical concern, not a conceptual issue. It would be immoral if the list of internationally-recognized human rights affected by how difficult they are to benchmark?

The Principle of Progressive Realization and the Resource Issue

In 1986, a group of international law experts drafted the *Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (hereafter, Limburg Principles). This document was intended to clarify the “nature and scope of the obligations of States parties”. The Limburg Principles asserted, among other things, that states’ obligations to begin fulfilling duties under the ICESCR are “immediate” (Article 16) and that “all appropriate means, including legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, social and educational measures” (Article 17) should be used.

While government efforts to implement/improve respect for economic, social, and cultural rights are to begin immediately upon ratification, full respect for these rights is seen as neither probabilistically quick nor simply assessable as being merely either “realized” or “not realized”. Unlike its sister document, the ICCPR, the ICESCR tasks governments with the duty to achieve "*progressively the full realization*" [emphasis added] of these rights (Article 2). Often, government respect for a particular right, or for a set of rights, is seen as dichotomous; that is, respect is present or absent. However, because respect for economic, social, and cultural rights, in particular, is gradually realized, any fair (and ethical, for that matter) structure used to assess progress of these rights needs to explicitly take this into account (Chapman 2007, 143-144).

Also unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR notes that a state's resources play a role in government's ability to respect the rights in the treaty. The *Masstricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (1997) (hereafter, Maastricht Guidelines), was a revisiting of the Limburg Principles on their tenth anniversary. Article 10 of this document addresses "availability of resources", stating that while states can comply with most of the rights in the ICESCR "with relative ease" it is the case sometimes that "full realization of the rights may depend upon the availability of adequate financial and material resources."

Some have used the resource constraint issue as the basis for arguing that economic, social, and cultural rights are not really human rights. Maurice Cranston argued that "[f]or a government to provide social security…it has to have access to great capital wealth…The government of India, for example, simply cannot command the resources that would guarantee each Indian an adequate standard of living" (Steiner, Alston, and Goodman 2008, 295). First, it is in our view, unethical to ascribe these rights to a lower status than political and civil rights merely because one might believe their realization to be difficult, either absolutely or relatively. Second, positions such as Cranston's assume that the stated inabilities to realize these rights come within a framework of optimal distribution of all available resources. That seems a far-fetched assumption. Donnelly (2003, 29) notes that "[r]esource shortages, as even the most conservative international financial institutions have come to understand, usually are largely attributable to poor governance" and problems of political economy, not scarcity.

We should be clear here, however, that neither the resource problem nor the progressive nature of realizing respect for these rights means states can linger in their address of critical needs/concerns. Article

9 of the Maastricht Principles sets out that states, no matter their resource structure, must meet “minimum core obligations”. Violations of this would occur when:

> … a State fails to satisfy what the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has referred to as "a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights… Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, violating the Covenant." Such minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties (Article 9).

Benchmarking Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The importance of improving respect for economic, social, and cultural rights is undeniable, and quantitative benchmarks are crucial. Without a tangible sense of how far countries have/have not come with regards to the progressive realization of the MDGs, for example, the ability to set targets and monitor progress is stunted. According to a World Bank estimate, approximately $106billion was given in official development assistance (ODA) in 2006. Organizations such as the US’ *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, the *Canadian International Development Agency*, Germany’s *Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development*, and many more all use quantitative benchmarks to decide who gets ODA funds, and how much.

First Generation

The first generation of benchmarks has produced several indicators of outcomes. Some also call these measures of status, progress, or achievement. Below, we review the two dominant outcome indicators.

The HDI

The most-widely used outcome indicator is the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), which is an index produced from information about life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The HDI ranges from 0 (lowest level of “human development”) to 1 (highest level).

One very troubling thing about the HDI is that it is built partially on both the assumption that wealth is a fair proxy for realizing respect for economic rights (or, as they call it, "development") and that wealth is an end in itself. While it has been a longstanding assumption (e.g., modernization theory) that macroeconomic wealth is a "core measure of human welfare" (Tata and Schultz 1988, 583; Despotis 2005), this is highly problematic in that societies having the same level of wealth often have widely divergent development/economic rights outcomes (Sen 2002; Cingranelli and Richards 2007; Fukuda-Parr, et. al. 2008). Further, treating wealth in this manner ignores the admonition of Article 10 of the Maastricht Principles that "full realization of the rights may depend upon the availability of adequate financial and material resources." Thus, *a priori*, the HDI is unfairly biased against poorer countries that do not have the resources to realize progress past the core minimum of respect expected from all countries at all levels of wealth (Maastricht Article 9).

The HDI's three components are theoretically weighted equally, and the correlation between a country's GDP and its HDI score is typically around .80; again, because of the linear modernization assumption and that the HDI treats wealth as an end in itself. Thus, poor countries are doomed to low/suppressed scores. This lies in stark contrast to the UN's claim that "Given the imperfect nature of wealth as gauge of human development, the HDI offers a powerful alternative to GNP for measuring the relative socio-economic progress at national and sub-national levels."[4] From empirical analyses using the HDI's gender-oriented twin indicator, the Gender Development Index (GDI), Richards and Gelleny (2007) conclude that in addition to the high correlation between national wealth and GDI scores, the "strong reliable positive association of … GDI with the rather-stagnant indicator of national wealth, and our trade and FDI indicators, hint strongly that …[GDI is]… constructed using the controversial assumption that wealth begets gender equality in a linear fashion" (868). Were the HDI really nonlinear as claimed (due to the logarithmic transformation), linear-based techniques such as simple correlation and regression should not be producing the robust and strong associations between HDP and GDP that they are.

[4] http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/

Finally, the HDI's problems are compounded by the facts that (a) its three indicators are empirically assumed independent of one another, and that (b) the HDI seems to imply that wealth affects respect for economic rights equally across all related policy possibilities (Kelley 1991). In its defense, the UN notes that its logarithmic transformation of GDP per capita empirically accounts for the fact that it expects no further development from the richest states, making it fair to them.[5] However, that's not the problem, which is clearly that even should a poor country make wise low-cost investments in improving literacy and life expectancy, its HDI score will be hurt for the fact it did not achieve parallel macroeconomic growth. That is not in keeping with expectations under ICESCR/Limburg/Maastricht.

Mahlberg and Obersteiner (2001) and Despotis (2005) use data envelopment analysis (DEA) modeling to produce a "better" HDI. Rather than using experts to set the minimum and maximum attainable values of the HDI's disaggregated components (on which its three constituent sub-indices rely), DEA uses available data to produce a "best practice frontier" and countries are then compared against those that form this frontier. Here, a country's score is a ratio: the difference between a minimum score and its predicted score, divided by the difference between the same minimum score and observed score. While progress in a laudable direction, this still (a) primarily compares countries on macroeconomic wealth, (b) uses (theoretically and empirically) the assumption that rich countries cannot do better, (c) reduces to arbitrary minimum/maximum values in trying to get around the problem that DEA allows countries that are "superior" in only one of the three dimensions to form part of the best practice frontier, and (d) seems to produce results not too far different from the original HDI.[6]

Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer, and Randolph (2009) use what they call the "achievement possibility frontier" (APF) approach to create an improved outcome benchmark. The logic is similar to DEA in that countries' scores are reliant upon an empirically-constructed parameter of what is the highest achievable rate of progress. One gross improvement is that a country's APF is, in part, determined by its wealth (GDP). This makes comparison across countries with differing levels of wealth more fair. However, a

[5] http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/

[6] One enduring criticism of the HDI is that the minimum and maximum expected values from which its sub-indices are constructed are subjectively set by expert-judgment methods and, as a result, scores are biased.

country's APF is set relative to the historical maximum of other countries at that level of wealth. This does not provide a very progressive standard, and built into that historical maximum could be drastically different conditions than any particular country to which it serves as a standard of achievement. Our chief concern however, is the theoretical specification, as we believe their index suffers from an attribution problem. That is, their index makes no distinction between economic rights conditions and economic rights practices of countries. This is important because increased respect for economic rights could be the result of non-government intervention and/or charity rather than *government action*, which is of definitional importance in their measure due to the wealth component. We will address in detail later, when we describe our own model's specification.

The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)

Another outcome measure is the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) (Morris 1979). The PQLI is a composite of three indicators: infant mortality per thousand live births, life expectancy at age one, and the adult literacy rate. The ranges for the first two indicators are transformed to a 0 to 100 scale, and then the index is computed by taking the unweighted arithmetic mean of all three indicators.

In some respects, the PQLI and HDI are similar: they use three indicators to proxy the latent trait "development/respect for economic rights" and these three indicators are weighted equally. Two of the three indicators in the PQLI are also used in the HDI. However, there are some key differences. First, unlike the HDI, wealth is not built into the PQLI as an end in itself, and for that reason we view the PQLI as more fair to poorer countries. Second, the PQLI's sub-indicator scores are not constructed relative to minimum and maximum parameters subjectively set by expert judges.

Cingranelli and Abouharb (2008) point out that the most-leveled criticism of the PQLI is the equal weighting of its three components. We agree with them, however, that there is no persuasive substantive argument for a different weighting across human rights that are supposed to be equal and interdependent. Indeed, any such unequal weighting scheme can also be viewed as *ad hoc*, at best, or unethical, at worst (McCormick and Mitchell 1997). Like HDI, however, the PQLI is susceptible to the criticism that its methodology of construction treats its components as independent when, in fact, they interdependent. Also, in practice, like with HDI, the correlation between PQLI and national wealth is about .80. Here, the culprit seems not to be building in wealth as an end, but a sub-indicator selection biased towards outcomes dominated by/correlated with wealth.

Second Generation

Lesson number one from the first generation of benchmarks of economic, social, and cultural rights is that new measures must be divorced from the arcane premise that wealth is an end in itself, and that progress in respect for these rights accrues linearly with wealth. We do not deny that being a wealthy country is an important advantage to respecting economic, social, and cultural rights. However, we do reject the minimalist definition of development/economic rights *qua* wealth. We also reject as unethical the unweighted comparison of rich versus poor countries across any set of outcomes of these rights.

The second lesson is that we must focus our benchmarking beyond outcomes towards *effort*. Imagine you are a doctor treating an Type-II diabetic patient who is not feeling any better since the last visit. To best treat your patient, you will need a variety of information/benchmarks to determine what course of treatment to pursue. First, of course, you have at your disposal a number of outcome benchmarks, likely through analyzing a sample of the patient's blood. However, before you prescribe medication, you need some information about what efforts the patient is making towards progress. Have they been exercising? Have they changed their diet? You might reasonably pursue a very different course if the answer to both of those is "yes" as opposed to "no". And so it is for those seeking to improvement respect for economic, social, and cultural rights – we must know not only where a country is on the continuum of progressive realization for these rights but, also, how hard they are trying to improve. Knowing the level of government effort that is going into progressive realization of these rights should be of particular interest to those involved with the disbursement of ODA.

Cingranelli and Richards (2007) propose a benchmark of government effort to respect economic human rights. Their measure is the residual from a nonlinear regression of PQLI and a government's ICESCR party status onto PQLI. This produces a version of the PQLI less-correlated with wealth than is the original formulation, and one not based on the linear modernization assumption, but it is not a measure of effort. Furthermore, their inclusion of treaty status biases the measure upwards for wealthy non-parties such as the United States.

Summary / Proposal

In the following sections, we will propose an improved methodology for creating a measure of government *effort* to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. Our framework is based upon the following three tenets:

1. Wealth is not an end in itself.
2. It is unfair/unethical to compare states without accounting for differences in resources to achieve respect for economic, social, and cultural rights.
3. Since non-state actors, often foreign, can greatly affect respect for economic, social, and cultural rights, any benchmark of effort to respect these rights is theoretically misspecified and empirically upwardly biased to the extent these activities are not considered.

MEASURING GOVERNMENT EFFORT

The degree to which a state's citizens enjoy their economic, social, and cultural rights is a function of the ability of that state to meet those obligations, the contributions of actors other than the state, and finally, government effort. It is the accounting for the contributions of non-state actors that sets our methodology apart from the efforts of others as a measure of *effort*, rather than outcomes. A properly-specified measure of government effort must parse governmental factors from non-governmental factors that could contribute to progressive realization of respect for economic, social, and cultural rights. Any given outcome could be due to government effort, NGO effort, luck, or a combination of these and many other factors. Thus, any benchmark of *effort* is theoretically misspecified and empirically upwardly biased to the extent that nongovernment activities are not considered. The indicators produced by Mahlberg and Obersteiner (2001), Despotis (2005), Cingranelli and Richards (2007), and Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer, and Randolph (2009) are wealth-corrected outcome measures, as they do not address the attribution issue of non-state contributions to outcomes.

Wealth can be seen as the primary component of ability. As the high correlation between PQLI and wealth demonstrates, wealthy states, by simple virtue of their wealth, are capable of providing their citizens with a higher level of enjoyment than poor states. Indeed, previous research makes clear that increasing aggregate wealth is strongly related to increasing fulfillment of basic human needs (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens 2004; Milner et al. 2004; Milner 2000; Moon & Dixon 1985; Morris 1979; Park 1987; Rosh 1986). However, this relationship seems to work in a primarily nonlinear fashion (Cingranelli and Richards 2007; Morris 1979). When national wealth is low, so is the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. As wealth increases, enjoyment of these rights do as well; however, as states approach the upper end of wealth, increases in state wealth produce decreasing marginal returns in terms of rights enjoyment. Even the most wealthy states face problems with poverty, infant mortality, education, and the like; while the reduction of these problems is relatively inexpensive at lower levels of development, their complete eradication at the higher end of the wealth spectrum is very expensive. Therefore, we assume that this relationship takes on the form of a sigmoid or "S" curve.

Thus, any attempt to develop an unbiased measure of state effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights should take into account the degree to which the state is able to engage in such effort, i.e. the wealth of that state. However, enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights is not merely a result of state wealth and effort; other "nongovernmental" actors make very direct contributions to the human rights conditions within the state. In particular, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), NGOs, and the foreign aid organizations associated with highly developed states engage in actions that could very well lead to improved economic, social, and cultural rights conditions, particularly in low-income states. For instance, Oxfam International, a large international development NGO, engages in large-scale programs aimed at increasing development and providing humanitarian aid around the world (Oxfam International 2009a, http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/what/mission)[7]. Similarly, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an organization within the United States government, is responsible

[7] Interestingly, Oxfam (2009b, http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/why) makes explicit that its development goals are derived from a desire to increase the enjoyment of human rights worldwide.

for distributing a large portion of U.S. foreign aid with the expressed goal of working “in agriculture, democracy & governance, economic growth, the environment, education, health, global partnerships, and humanitarian assistance in more than 100 countries to provide a better future for all” (USAID 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/). These two organizations exemplify the fact that some actors other than the government attempt to (and might actually) affect the degree to which citizens enjoy their human rights. Therefore, in our attempt to develop an improved methodology for gauging government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights, we account for the actions of these nongovernmental actors.

How does one create a measure of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights that controls for differences in wealth and the contributions of nongovernmental actors? A possible solution would be to simply look at the policies of the government and the proportion of the government budget that goes toward the fulfillment of such rights. However, this approach is quite problematic in practice. While polices are an important precursor to satisfactory human rights conditions, they are often little more than statements of intent. As such, the ratification of international human rights treaties, constitutional bills of rights, and laws prohibiting police abuse of criminal suspects can all be seen as human rights policies. Our primary concern, however, is not what a government says it will do, but rather the degree to which it lives up to the obligations placed upon states by international law (in this case, the ICESCR). Therefore, policies are not viable for the measurement of government effort.

While expenditures as a percentage of government spending may get us closer to our goal of measuring government effort, they fall short as well. First, some expenditures that would seemingly increase enjoyment of human rights may actually work at cross purposes. Forced sterilization may be grouped with “healthcare” expenditures; mass displacement of an area’s residents could be grouped with “housing” expenditures. Second, different states face different sets of challenges and different national priorities, which are not always chosen by the states themselves but rather by circumstances beyond their control. Therefore, it may be unfair to compare expenditures across states. Third, the use of expenditures to measure government effort makes *a priori* assumptions about the proper economic orientation of the state, its role in the economy, and the necessary conditions for the achievement of economic, social, and cultural rights. While some political scientists (e.g. Howard and Donnelly 1986) and economists (e.g. Sen 1999) have provided good reason to believe that government intervention is likely necessary in order to improve enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, proponents of neoliberal economics (e.g.,Yergin and Stainslaw 1998) provide reasons to think otherwise. Therefore, it would be more useful to create a measure that would allow for testing the hypotheses posited by these differing schools of thought than to simply accept a measure which tacitly accepts the proposals of one over the other.

A General Methodology for Measuring Government Effort

In light of these problems, we present a general methodology for the measurement of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. The logic behind our method is as follows: A properly fitted regression of any indicator of the enjoyment of these rights on both the ability of the state and the efforts of nongovernmental actors will produce predicted values for each state. That is, the predicted values provide an expectation of the degree to which we can expect the citizens within a state to enjoy the rights inherent in the chosen indicator, given the wealth and work of nongovernmental actors within that state. However, most states will display an actual level of enjoyment that differs from this predicted value. The distance between these two values, i.e. the residual, becomes our measure of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights.

In this framework, the residual tells us how well a state is performing in providing the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights given that state's position *vis-à-vis* wealth and nongovernmental contributions. States with a residual of zero have produced the exact result one would expect given their resources. States with a positive residual have produced a higher level of enjoyment of these rights than would be expected from ability and nongovernmental input, and this is interpreted as great *effort* to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. On the other hand, states with a negative residual have actually done less than would be expected, which is interpreted as a lack of effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights.

Using Residuals

Engaging in the substantive interpretation of residuals is not new -- important research has used the technique. Robert Solow (1957), Nobel Laureate in Economics, attributed the residual in his economic growth model to technological advances, producing the so-called “Solow residual.” Gurr and Moore (1997) use the residuals from their model of ethnopolitical rebellion as risk assessments predicting future rebellions; Poe, Rost, and Carey (2006) use the same technique to create human rights risk assessments. Logically, our residuals are substantively interpretable to the extent we have correctly theoretically specified the model from which they are produced. The logic is one of process-of-elimination. If we have accounted, in our model, for the most-important factors that could affect these outcomes *except* actual *government effort* in light of these resources and contributions, then residuals should represent the level of government effort exerted.

As stated above, one can conceive of our measure of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights as the residual from the following regression:

Human Rights Enjoyment = a + Ability + Nongovernmental Contributions + *e*

where *e*, as the residual, represents government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights.

Methodology And Data

The process we use to create our effort measure is straightforward:

1. An outcomes measure of economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR) is created.
2. The measure of ESCR from step one will be used as the dependent variable in a nonlinear regression on both government’s ability to respect these rights and nongovernmental inputs that could affect respect for these rights.
3. The residuals produced from the regression in step two are our effort scores.

Below, we detail this process.

1. Measuring Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR) Outcomes

Data Availability

Step one is to develop a measure of ESCR enjoyment that would account for the vast majority of the provisions contained in the ICESCR. However, data availability is a serious issue. After an extensive data search, we are still unable to find data that covers a sufficient number of years and countries while providing appropriate operationalization of enjoyment of the rights to work, education, and equal pay for equal work.

In attempting to operationalize enjoyment of the right to work, our first preference was to use a strong cross-national measure of unemployment. Unemployment data are often criticized for displaying a great deal of spurious fluctuation (Summers 1981) as well as for who the measure does and does not count as “unemployed” (Jones and Riddell 1999). Still, as a measure that attempts to gauge the number of those seeking employment who are unable to attain it, even a somewhat flawed cross-national measure of unemployment would have been a strong indicator of the degree to which citizens enjoy the right to work. However, it would seem that such data simply does not exist for most countries in the world for a considerable time-series. For example, unemployment data are only sufficiently available during the past two decades for a small number of states, which were mostly at high levels of development (World Bank 2007; ILO 2008). Therefore, we turned our attention to other measures, such as the employment-to-population ratio. This measure gauges the number of people employed as a ratio of the working age population. Due to the fact that it includes persons who may not be seeking employment, such a students or stay-at-home parents, it is not as strong a measure of the enjoyment of the right to work as a valid measure of unemployment would be; however, in the absence of such a measure, the employment-to-population ratio may serve.

The natural measure for enjoyment of the right to education, which includes the requirement that states ensure access to free and compulsory primary education (ICESCR 1966, Article 13.2.a.), is the proportion of the eligible population enrolled in primary education. Sadly, after an extensive search, we found the availability of these data to be absent for low and middle-income countries. Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer and Randolph (2009, 202) also bemoan the lack of available education data and end up only examining the right to education for high-income countries. Neither World Bank (2007) nor the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD 2008) have adequate spatial coverage or time series availability for their primary school enrollment data for our purposes in this paper; both demonstrate data for a large number of states only for the years 1991 and 1999 – 2004.

As "equal pay for equal work" varies widely even among highly developed states, we had hoped to find a ratio-level measure of this right. Sadly, after an extensive search, we are still unaware of any such measure. We do include a proxy for the degree to which women receive pay equal to that of men for equal work in our indicator of "women's economic rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2009). As we believe that this is an important right that helps to demonstrate a unique dimension of ESCR upon which the vast majority of states could still improve a great deal, it is our hope that a widely available measure of the right to equal pay for equal work will be developed in the near future.

Our Three Components

With the aforementioned data limitations in mind, we attempt to use available data to create a measure that we believe serves as a strong proxy measure of the degree to which a state's citizens enjoy the majority of rights listed in the ICESCR. In doing so, we use three indicators as proxies: PQLI, women's economic rights, and worker rights. Each of these indicators is discussed in detail below.

PQLI: As stated above, the PQLI (Morris 1979) is a composite indicator based on infant mortality per thousand live births, life expectancy at age one, and the adult literacy rate that, unlike HDI, does not assume that state wealth is an end in itself in the enjoyment of ESCR. Thus, as shown in Table 1, we believe it serves as an excellent proxy for the rights to an adequate standard of living, food, and healthcare. If citizens' standard of living improves, which includes improvement in access to adequate food, water, shelter, and healthcare, one would expect that both their life expectancies and the infant mortality rate would be improved. Furthermore, an adequate standard of living also can include giving citizens to further their own self-actualization, which should lead to increased levels of adult literacy. Furthermore, given the lack of primary school enrollment data, the level of adult literacy can also provide insight into the degree to which primary education is available within society, i.e. enjoyment of the right to education. PQLI data were obtained from Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007)[8.]

Women's Economic Rights: According to Articles 2, 3, 7, and 10 of the ICESCR (1966), women and men alike are equally entitled to all of the rights listed in the ICESCR and, thus, have the rights to work, equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession, and equality and freedom from discrimination in the workplace, among other rights. We account for the degree to which the government ensures women's enjoyment of these rights by using the women's economic rights measure from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2008). This measure varies from 0 to 3, where a "0" represents no rights under state law and a high level of societal discrimination and a "3" represents full respect for these rights in state law and enjoyment of them in practice. This measure is useful for a number of reasons. Beyond simply providing information on the economic rights of women as listed in the ICESCR, the women's economic rights measure gives us insight, which is discussed in greater detail below, into the general enjoyment of the right to work in society, one of the rights for which we lack appropriate data. Furthermore, given the lack of data concerning the right to equal pay for equal work, this measure allows us an indicator that, while not solely focused on this issue, includes the degree to which this right is enjoyed in its coding.

Workers' Rights: Finally, according to Articles 7, 8, and 10 of the ICESCR (1966), workers have the rights to association, collective bargaining, freedom from compulsory labor, freedom from child labor, and acceptable working conditions, among other rights. The worker rights measure from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2008) accounts for the degree to which these rights are protected in practice, and thus, we include it in our composite measure. The worker rights measure varies from 0 to 2 where "0" represents severe restrictions on worker rights, "1" represents some restrictions, and "2" represents full protection of worker rights.

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[8] Abouharb and Cingranelli (2008) received a large portion of their PQLI data from Callaway (2001) and Milner (1998). We thank all authors for making these data readily available.

Our Components' Capabilities as Proxies

While we are merely attempting to demonstrate how one would use our method to produce a measure of government effort, there is good reason to suspect that the measure of enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights developed above is a good proxy for the enjoyment of all the rights listed in Table 1 (excluding the right to self-determination). For example, while we may not include data on the right to work, our women's rights measure takes into account the degree to which women are capable of enjoying this right. In perhaps every state in the world, women's economic rights are at greater risk of violation than men's; therefore, it seems a reasonable assumption that, if women are enjoying these rights, men are enjoying them at either an equal, or likely higher, level. Therefore, we can have some confidence that a factor score based on PQLI, women's economic rights, and worker rights is a valid proxy for the degree to which a state's citizens enjoy their rights as listed in the ICESCR.

Finally, we exclude the right to self-determination from our ESCR measure because self-determination is one of the defining components of democratic regimes. As such, including it in our measure of ESCR enjoyment would make it more difficult to use such a measure to make determinations about how differences between regime types affect government effort to respect the majority of rights in the ICESCR. We see the ability to conduct future studies that could make such determinations as one of the important contributions that a measure of government effort to respect ESCR could make to the quantitative study of human rights. Therefore, we exclude measures of electoral self-determination from the measure created here.

Creating the Measure of ESCR Enjoyment

<Table 1 About Here>

Our measure of ESCR enjoyment was created by using principal factor analysis on our three data components. Table 1 shows the unrotated loadings for each year of our analysis. We created scores annually because, as we will see later, the residuals are produced by annual regressions. Looking across the loadings, all are above the .40 threshold for inclusion in a factor/dimension (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Gorsuch 1997; Velicer and Fava 1998; Raubenheimer 2004). It is important that these four ESCR components can be empirically demonstrable as unidimensional, because they are supposed to have some commonality in the manner in which they affect human dignity. No stable second factor solution presented itself from any of the analyses. As would be expected should their validity be reasonable, the two women's rights indicators from CIRI loaded most strongly together. Commonly, but not always, PQLI loaded more strongly than did the workers' rights component.

The Bartlett scoring method was used to create factor scores for each country in each of our years. Table 1 shows the N of countries included in each factor analysis. One way to look at these numbers is as a comment on data availability, which seems to improve over time. These figures will be different from the Ns for the regressions, as the independent variables will present further data availability challenges.

2. The Nonlinear Regression

Our measure of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights is the residual from a regression of three factors of governmental ability and non-governmental efforts on our measure of outcomes described above. We use a four-parameter nonlinear (logistic function) regression to account for the aforementioned nonlinear sigmoid relationship that exists between a state's ability to provide economic, social, and cultural rights and the degree to which its citizens enjoy those rights. We run annual regressions so as to not commit the error of having the future affect the present, since we provide scores for each year from 1984 to 2004. Further, as Cingranelli and Richards (2007) point out, PQLI trends upwards over time, and we do not wish to build this into our measure.

Each of our three independent variables representing government ability and nongovernmental effort is discussed in detail below.

Ability

National Wealth:

If citizens are to fully enjoy the substance of their economic, social, and cultural rights, then the resources necessary for the provision of those rights must be present, i.e. the resources within the state must be sufficient. As stated above, we refer to these resources as the *ability* of the state to ensure that its citizens enjoy their economic, social, and cultural rights. We view the amount of wealth in a state as the primary indicator of ability. Wealthy states, even those with governments that are firmly opposed to intervention in the economy, are capable of outperforming poor states in the provision of ESCR simply due to the fact that more resources are available to both the state and the citizens of that state to provide the substance of those rights. Our measure of the number of resources within society is Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In particular, we measure ability using the logarithm of a country's GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). These data were obtained from the Penn World Table (Heston, et al. 2006).

Nongovernmental Efforts

If our measure is to truly account for the degree to which enjoyment of ESCR can be attributed to efforts on the part of the state, we must account for the degree to which other actors contribute to that enjoyment, i.e. the effort of nongovernmental actors. Nongovernmental effort is divided into contributions by several different kinds of actors: foreign governments of the highly developed states, IGOs, and INGOs. The measures used to gauge these organizations contributions are discussed in detail below.

Official Development Assistance

The contribution of foreign governments to the enjoyment of ESCR in other states is measured through the amount of official development assistance (ODA) received by a country in a given year. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009), its wealthy member states are committed to creating a higher standard of living and higher levels of development throughout the world. As such, OECD members provide development assistance to developing countries of the world in hopes of achieving these (and other) goals. Furthermore, the individual organizations utilized by foreign governments to provide this assistance express similar goals, as demonstrated by USAID's (2009) commitment to "a better future for all," and the German Federal Government's *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ 2009), which states that its goal is to work worldwide to "improve people's living conditions on a sustainable basis." Therefore, in order to account for the degree to which these outside actors contribute to the enjoyment of ESCR, we include data on the amount of ODA received by a state in a given year. These data were obtained from the World Bank (2007).

International Organizations

Beyond the efforts of foreign governments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) also engage in actions aimed at improving the enjoyment of ESCR. As mentioned before, development INGOs, such as Oxfam International (2009), engage in actions aimed at improving the enjoyment of ESCR worldwide. Furthermore, even though they pay less attention to ESCR than they do other rights, human rights INGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have recently expressed commitments to improving respect for ESCR worldwide (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). Likewise, intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, are often at the center of international efforts to improve enjoyment of ESCR, as exemplified by the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, while it is clear that INGOs and IGOs contribute to the enjoyment of these rights, measuring the degree of this contribution is rather difficult. Therefore, as a proxy for the contribution of INGOs and IGOs, we used the count of INGO and IGO offices operating within a country in any given year, which is similar to the measure of INGO strength used by Landman (2005). The assumption behind this measure is that, in order for an NGO or an INGO to engage in actions beneficial to the enjoyment of ESCR in a country in a previous year, it must have a presence in that country. The number of offices in a country, while not a perfect measure of ESCR-related effort on the part of these organizations, does give some idea about the capability of these organizations to exert such effort. Theferore, we believe that it is a reliable proxy for the nongovernmental effort exerted by INGOs and NGOs. In each country for each year, the measure consists of the number of offices from INGOs and IGOs that can be reliably expected to have a hand in the improvement of human rights enjoyment and is based on information contained in the Union of International Associations' *Yearbook of International Organizations* (UIA, various years).

3. Creating the Effort Measure

A nonlinear (logistic-function) regression was run for 1990, 1995, and 2000. Each of the independent variables except our dichotomous SAP implementation indicator was transformed using a logarithmic process (base 10), so as to minimize any effects of skewness on the analyses. Each regression produced, for each country, a predicted score for that country on the dependent variable (ESCR enjoyment), based on the values of the three independent variables for that country. A country's actual score (its dependent variable value) was subtracted from its predicted score, creating a residual. For example, a positive residual indicates greater achievement on the dependent variable than would be expected given the data used in the analysis. It is these residuals that we use as our effort scores. The following findings section demonstrated what our analyses found.

FINDINGS: EFFORT SCORES

One important part of our overall goal was to produce an indicator not highly associated with national wealth. Indeed, the correlation between our three sets of effort scores and national wealth (GDP/cap) for 1990, 1995, and 2000 are .41, .34, and .34, respectively.

<Table 2 About Here>

Table 2 shows mean scores of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights for the world, and for four regions with sufficient Ns to report results.[9] First, notice that the mean world effort score drops across our three time points, most significantly between 1990 and 1995. Judging just from the information in the table, this appears to perhaps be associated with a precipitous decline in mean effort in Latin America after 1990, but also with decreases in Africa and Asia. Europe demonstrated a decline in mean effort from 1995 to 2000. It might be reasonable to believe this has something to do with the post-Cold War economics of both established and nascent countries in that region. By far, Africa evidences the lowest effort scores of any region, throughout the entire period of our study.

[9] Our operationalizations of regions are those created by the United Nations Statistics Division. These can be found at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm

<Table 3 About Here>

Table 3 digs a bit deeper and shows the top and bottom five effort scores for each of the three years in our study. The first thing that stands out is that the top five-list is not only populated with the world's richest states. For example, while Luxembourg is among the very wealthiest states of the world, Belize, Mongolia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova are certainly not considered to be wealthy states. The second thing that stands out is that the list is dominated by European countries, broadly speaking, although Mongolia tops the 2000 scores. Iceland is the only country that makes the top-five list in all three time-points. Its scores in 1990 and 2000 are similar, with its 1995 score being almost a full point higher. Should our methodology of creating effort scores prove sound, it will be interesting to create annual scores to examine stability over time in particular countries.

<Tables 4,5 About Here>

Tables 4 through 7 are region-specific versions of Table 3, showing the top and bottom-five effort scores in each for each year. In Table 4, Africa, we see Mauritius represented all three years in the top five, although it loses its "best: status in 2000. On the other hand, both Kenya and Sudan have the dubious honor of making the bottom-five each year. Burkina Faso's effort score of -3.069 was the lowest of any country in the world in any year. In Table 5, Asia, Mongolia's score for 2000 is the highest for any country in the world in any year, and Mongolia makes the top-five list each year. One reason for this may be Mongolia's constitutional instantiation of economic, social, and cultural rights rights (Minkler 2009, 390-191).

<Tables 6,7 About Here>

Table 6, Europe, contains the highest effort scores of this set of tables. Iceland is the number-one country in all three years. Given the indicators used to construct our measure of rights enjoyment, this makes sense given Iceland's strong traditional commitment to unionization, collective bargaining, the high rate of women's participation in the formal labor market (aided by subsidized daycare), high-ranking life expectancy, and world-low infant mortality rate.

Of note in Table 6 is the presence of countries such as The United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and France among the bottom-five European scores. This is interesting given Iceland's top status, because these countries are very similar on PQLI, wealth, worker's rights, women's economic rights, and ODA. Where they differ significantly is in the number of in-country NGO secretariats. For example, Iceland has about 1% of the NGO presence that Belgium does. We logged NGO presence (along with wealth and ODA) in the regressions used to produce our residuals, however, and both normal-probability plotting and skewness statistics tests (skewness = .46) showed the variable we used to be very reasonably normally distributed. There may be a theoretical issue at hand, in that the NGOs in OECD states are likely coordinating efforts to develop *other* countries. On the other hand, there are many NGOs in these countries advocating for the rights of disadvantaged groups in these societies, as well. At any rate, it appears very small distinctions between countries are driving larger distinctions in the European rankings. For example, in 1990, Italy scored lower than its cohorts on workers' rights, had a mid-level NGO score, and ended up in the bottom five. In 1995 its workers' rights score improved, but GDP per capita declined to $19,531 and it ended up in the bottom five once again. However, in 2000, with workers' rights fully respected, GDP per capita up to $22,487, and all else equal, Italy escapes the bottom five.

Table 7 shows effort scores for Latin America and the Caribbean. Immediately, one sees smaller countries dominating the top rankings, with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the top five each year. While Jamaica has similar PQLI scores to Mexico, a larger country in the bottom-five two out of three years, it does so with half the GDP per capita of Mexico, a third of the NGO presence, and less ODA. Furthermore, Jamaica has significantly better scores on respect for workers' rights and women's economic rights. So here, we see an instance where our operationalization of enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights beyond wealth or PQLI affects rankings on effort. We believe this is an advantage of our measure. One factor that might advantage smaller/island states may be that large part of their populations are not resident is significantly inaccessible portions of those countries. Many large Latin American states have significantly diverse and tough geographical areas. To the extent that infrastructure is underdeveloped and population lives in these areas, greater effort may be required to attain high levels of enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights.

ASSOCIATES OF EFFORT

Thus far, we have demonstrated a methodology for creating a measure of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights that is not correlated with wealth. However, the question remains: Which institutional structures, policies, and actions are associated with the efficient conversion of a state's resources into an increased well-being for its citizens? If a state respects civil and political rights, is it more likely to respect economic, social, and cultural rights? Do neoliberal economic policies demonstrate high efficiency in providing the substance of ESCR, or is government intervention in the economy necessary? Do corrupt governments produce less effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights? In the pages ahead, we perform a few exploratory analyses aimed at beginning the process of answering these questions. In particular, we focus on government respect for physical integrity and empowerment rights, government policy, corruption, and population size as factors that we believe could be associated with government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. While this list is not exhaustive of all possible factors affecting effort to respect ESCR, we believe it serves as a good starting point.

Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights

Underpinning the model of rights created by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an idea familiar to most human rights researchers, but often ignored in practice: that all internationally recognized human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent (Donnelly 2003). For example, Donnelly and Howard (1988) point out that the right to survival is not only guaranteed by the lack of physical attacks from government actors, but also by access to food and healthcare; the right to take an active and effective part in one's government is not only secured by the ability to vote and associate, but also by access to a quality education. Therefore, it would seem that, in order to fully enjoy any subset of human rights, one must enjoy all internationally recognized human rights.

Most previous studies of human rights (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; McCormick and Mitchell 1988) have focused on government respect for physical integrity rights, i.e. “the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their government” (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 407), to the exclusion of almost all other rights besides those associated with institutional democracy. This is partially due to the lack of valid measures of government respect for other rights, especially economic, social, and cultural rights. However, as this paper begins the process of filling this measurement gap, we include government respect for physical integrity rights in our model of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights, with the expectation that increased respect for physical integrity will yield a corresponding increase in government performance on economic, social, and cultural rights. Government respect for physical integrity rights is measured using the CIRI Human Rights Project’s Physical Integrity Rights Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2009), which is a 9-point additive index based on separate indicators of government respect for the rights against disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture.

Substantive Democracy: Government Respect for Empowerment Rights

Like physical integrity rights, government respect for empowerment rights, i.e. those rights which afford citizens control over their lives and their government (Donnelly and Howard 1988), would be deemed necessary for the protection of economic, social, and cultural rights by the human rights attributes of interdependence and indivisibility (Donnelly 2003). However, empowerment rights are also indicative of the regime type that, according to many (e.g. Howard and Donnelly 1986; Poe and Tate 1994), is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of human rights: democracy.

According to Howard and Donnelly (1986), the only type of government that could demonstrate respect for the full list of internationally recognized human rights was one rooted in a thick form of liberalism, based on the traditional liberal values of equal respect and equal concern for all citizens, of which democracy is a necessary part. Previous empirical studies of government respect for human rights have generally supported this assertion, finding that democracies, on average, demonstrate greater respect for various types of human rights (e.g. Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Davenport and Armstrong 2004;

Richards and Gelleny 2007). There is good reason to expect that a similar pattern will follow with respect to ESCR. As many previous researchers (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003; Powell 2000) have pointed out, an increase in the proportion of the population to which the government is directly accountable tends to result in a greater provision of public goods. When faced with a democratically empowered electorate capable of removing political leaders from office, these leaders are more likely to provide large-scale public goods rather than private goods in order to gain the support of a larger portion of the electorate. Therefore, it follows that democracies would be more likely to provide the substance of economic, social, and cultural rights to a larger number of their citizens than would other regime types.

However, as suggested by Howard and Donnelly's (1986) "thick liberalism", the institution of electoral democracy itself may be insufficient to support adequate respect for human rights. According to Richards (1999) and Richards and Gelleny (2007), elections alone may not necessarily improve respect for physical integrity rights; indeed, Richards and Gelleny (2007) find that legislative elections can increase respect for some human rights while executive elections actually decrease such respect. Furthermore, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) find that improvements in democratic governance short of full, consolidated democracy have no effect on respect for human rights.

Therefore, it would seem that what we would consider substantive democracy, i.e. the protection of empowerment rights, may be more important for the enforcement of other human rights than the simple act of voting itself, as respect for these rights not only holds the government accountable to the majority of voters, but also empowers minorities by giving all citizens the ability to engage in the political process without fear of reprisal from a tyrannical majority. Governments that allow citizens to freely exercise their empowerment rights without fear of politically-motivated physical coercion can thus expect to be accountable to a much larger proportion of their populations than those that limit the protection of these rights. Furthermore, citizens that enjoy these rights will be allowed, through the exercise of their empowerment rights, more opportunity to demand government assistance in providing the substance of economic, social, and cultural rights, and political leaders that fail to do so may find themselves punished at the ballot box. Given this logic, governments that demonstrate a great deal of respect for empowerment rights should be expected, on average, to demonstrate greater government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. As such, our model of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights includes a measure of government respect for empowerment rights, the CIRI Human Rights Data Project's Empowerment Rights Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2009), which is an 11 point additive index based on individual measures of government respect for electoral self-determination, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, and workers' rights (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001).

Government Policy

Even governments that display identical respect for their citizens' physical integrity and empowerments rights may enact very different policies purportedly aimed at improving citizens' well-being. This is partially due to the fact that different ideological perspectives have very different beliefs about exactly which government policies best benefit citizens' enjoyment of their economic rights. On one hand, proponents of neoliberal economic reforms (e.g. Yergin and Stainslaw 2002) are likely to support decreased government intervention in the economy in the belief that allowing the free market to operate unhindered may cause short term difficulties, but will result in greater overall well-being in the long run. On the other hand, some human rights scholars (e.g. Howard and Donnelly 1986) and economists (e.g. Sen 1999) have suggested that government intervention may very well be necessary to ensure that all citizens receive the benefits guaranteed by their human rights. Therefore, in order to test these propositions, we include several measures of government policies that could impact economic, social and cultural rights, focusing particularly on government healthcare, military, and consumption expenditures, private healthcare expenditures, international treaty ratification, and structural adjustment implementation.

Government Spending. As we mentioned earlier in the paper, government expenditures are not strong direct indicators of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights because (1) even those expenditures that would seem to be aimed at improving these rights, such as healthcare expenditures, may be spent on practices, like forced sterilization, that run counter to respect for those rights and (2) expenditures provide no information about policy effectiveness or the efficiency of policy implementation. On the other hand, government expenditures *can* provide us with information about a government's policy priorities and the degree to which that government takes an active role in the economy. Therefore, in the analyses that follow, we include measures of government spending on the military and healthcare, as well as measures of private spending on healthcare and total government consumption, all measured as a percentage of GDP and obtained from the World Bank (2007).

The economic implications of military spending have long been a source of debate with the traditional economic argument that a trade-off exists between "guns and butter" finding support in some studies (e.g. Antonakis 1999; Deger and Sen 1983) while being refuted in others (e.g. Benoit 1973; Dixon and Moon 1986). On one hand, military spending may be indicative of a prioritization of security, stability, and safety over human rights; furthermore, one would expect military spending to accompany threatened and actual conflict, which is often found to be deleterious to government respect for human rights (e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; Keith 1999). On the other hand, military spending has been used to invigorate failing or stagnant economies; Block (1980) points out that the United States' decision to rearm following World War II was at least partly motivated by a desire to increase economic stability. Therefore, while we can say little about the expected direction of military spending's association with government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights, we can say that previous work supports the expectation that such an association exists.

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) states that all persons have the right to health care and that states are responsible for the "creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness." Thus, government spending on healthcare would be expected to be a valid associate of the degree to which the government prioritizes this obligation and attempts to fulfill it and thus, a valid associate of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. However, governments are not the only actors that can contribute to the overall level of healthcare; indeed, private expenditures on healthcare can make up a sizable portion of total healthcare expenditures even in states with largely state-owned healthcare systems.

That said, overly large amounts of private spending on healthcare tends to indicate that the state is doing little to create the opportunity for its poorest citizens to have access to quality healthcare. Therefore, we include measures of both public and private spending on healthcare with the expectation that public spending improves government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights through a more equitable distribution of healthcare across economic classes, while private spending leads to lower levels of government effort as it creates the impression that government intervention in health care is not necessary while leaving the poor with little access to quality care.

Ideally, we would include a measure of government transfers, such as welfare, unemployment insurance, and social security, to measure the degree to which the government looks after its citizens well-being in times of hardship, as these types of activities are all included in the equal concern component of Howard and Donnelly's (1986) concept of thick liberalism, which they see as necessary for the protection of the full list of internationally recognized human rights, and are included in the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). However, data on such transfers for all countries in the world are rare, especially given the time period under study in this paper. Therefore, we use total government consumption, i.e. government spending on goods and services, as a proxy providing information on the size of the government and the government's general position regarding its own intervention in the economy. Proponents of neoliberalism (e.g. Yergin and Stainslaw 2002) would suggest that increased government size would yield decreased enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights in the long run, while others (e.g. Sen 1999) would suggest that some government intervention may be necessary to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights.

<u>International Treaty Ratification.</u> As the UN's primary instrument for securing government commitment to expend effort on securing the economic, social, and cultural rights of their citizenries, a state's ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides a very public statement on the part of states that they will see to their citizens' well-being. States that have signed and ratified the ICESCR may find that their practices are placed under a higher level of scrutiny by the international community; thus, for the protection of their international reputations, they

may have a greater incentive to put effort into respecting their citizens' economic, social, and cultural rights. However, as Landman (2005) points out, the effectiveness of these treaties may be severely limited by their rather weak enforcement structures; indeed, previous studies have found mixed results concerning the effect of human rights treaties on actual government practices (e.g. Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Landman 2005). Keith (1999) found that those states that had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were likely to demonstrate greater respect for human rights; however, when placed in a multivariate analysis, ratification of the ICCPR was no longer statistically significant in predicting a state's human rights behavior. Hathaway (2002) expanded the number of treaties being analyzed, but still found similar results. On the other hand, by taking into account states that had signed, but not yet ratified, human rights treaties, Landman (2005) found that participation in the international human rights regime had a limited, but statistically significant positive impact on state human rights practices. Therefore, we hypothesize that ICESCR ratification will lead to increased government effort to respect economic rights and include ratification status in our analyses using data obtained from Landman (2005).

<u>Structural Adjustment</u>. Our analyses also take into account whether a state has agreed to undergo structural adjustment with the aid of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. Structural adjustment plans implemented by these organizations often come with large amounts of money, provided with the understanding that the government will use the money to implement neoliberal economic reforms (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) have found that *enjoyment* of economic rights, as measured by PQLI, is diminished by government acquiescence to structural adjustment; furthermore, they find that these negative effects seem to increase with increased time under structural adjustment. As the decision to undergo structural adjustment lies firmly with the government, this would seem to be a likely associate of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. Therefore, we include the number of years a state has been under a structural adjustment plan using data obtained from Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007).

Corruption and Property Rights

Past studies have found corruption to have negative economic consequences, such as increased inequality (Gupta et al. 2002) and economic growth (Anoruo and Braha 2005).This makes sense, as corruption would result in a decrease in economic efficiency due to reallocation of funds away from improving the general well-being and toward private goods provided to those that are already in a position of power. When dealing with government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights, the level of corruption should be especially important as it provides information about the degree to which funds allocated by the government for the improvement of citizens' well-being can be expected to be plundered as rent by government officials and their agents. Thus, in the corrupt state, the amount of money actually spent on efforts to respect economic, social, and cultural rights would actually be smaller than the amount reported in government budgets. Furthermore, if citizens cannot trust their government to enforce contracts and refrain from graft, they have little incentive to attempt to use their resources in ways that might improve the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights for their fellow citizens, such as engaging in trade or entrepreneurial enterprises (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994).Thus, in the corrupt state, government graft could lead to a hoarding of resources in the form of currency, where they can be hidden from the government but do little to stimulate widespread economic growth and enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights.

Therefore, in order to measure government corruption, we use Contract Intensive Money (CIM), which is the "ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply" (Clague et al. 1999, 188). Non-currency money is often held in banks or assets, which are visible to the government and could be targets for bribe-seeking officials. If citizens are willing to keep some of their assets in forms that rely on the government's protection to prevent theft, then they likely trust that the government will protect their property rights, enforce their contracts, and generally not practice or encourage graft. This usage of CIM, while unique, is not necessarily innovative, as previous studies have used CIM to measure the protection of property rights and contract enforcement (Clague et al. 1999; Souva, Swift, and Rowan 2008) as well as judicial independence (Conrad 2009; Powell and Staton 2009; R`ıos-Figueroa and Staton 2008).

Following R`ıos-Figueroa and Staton (2008), we feel that CIM serves as a strong indicator of corruption because it focuses on the behavioral consequences of corruption rather than relying on opinions of others or on the number of times actual instances of corruption (which tends to be clandestine) is observed.That is, if the level of corruption is high in a state, citizens will engage in activities that protect their assets from graft and will hide their money from the government by keeping it out of banks and other such institutions, resulting in a low value for CIM. Thus, we expect CIM to be positively associated with government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights.

Population

States with larger populations face greater obstacles in organizing the provision of ESCR to their citizens than do smaller states. Thus, states with larger populations require larger bureaucracies and incur greater costs in their efforts to see to their citizens' well-being, which consumes resources that, in a smaller state, may have found their way to the citizens themselves. For instance, if a large state wants to implement a large-scale government run healthcare program, it will need to employ a greater number of people, incur higher transportation costs, and spend more on materials than would a state with a smaller population. Due to these higher costs, the large state will require a higher level of organization and oversight than would the small state, thus creating inefficiencies that smaller states might bypass. Furthermore, previous studies of government respect for physical integrity have found that higher populations are associated with less respect for human rights, which might be attributed to the strain caused by the increased demand for scarce resources (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994). Therefore, we anticipate that states with larger populations will display lower government effort to protect economic rights, and we test this proposition using data from the Penn World Table (Heston, et al. 2006).

Regression Results

<Table 8 About Here>

Table 8 presents the results from a regression model testing the reliability of several possible associates of government effort. We report beta coefficients because we are only interested here in determining level of statistical significance and the relative strength of association among significant variables. The figures in parentheses represent not standard errors but, rather, the probability for each coefficient of making a Type-I error in rejecting H0 that there is no reliable association between that coefficient and government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. We report separate models for each year of our study, and each model is significantly different from its null counterpart (which assumes all slopes are simultaneously zero). Positive coefficients indicate an association with greater government effort.

The only two factors reliably associated with effort all three years are government respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. In terms of relative magnitude of impact on effort, these are also the strongest associates with effort. Theoretically, human rights are assumed to be interdependent, so the fact Table 8 shows two types of human rights to be strong associates of another type is interesting. However, it is more interesting considering the fact that, as we discussed earlier in this paper, some believe that economic rights are not human rights. We can certainly say they behave like human rights, empirically, in one important sense.

A country’s ICESCR party status shows no reliable association with effort, nor does its level of military spending. The length of time a country remains under a SAP is associated such that the longer the duration, the less the government effort. This supports the arguments of critics of SAPs, in particular, and neoliberal economic reforms, in general. Population size is shown to be significantly associated with less effort the larger a population in both 1990 and 2000. We believe the statistically insignificant coefficient for 1995 might be the result of India’s having an effort score twice that of its 1990 and 2000 scores. Standing out among the components of the effort score, India reported a much-higher amount of ODA in 1995 that it did in either 1990 or 2000, and had a better score on workers’ rights than in those years. The measure of contract intensive money (CIM) was only a reliable associate of effort in 1990. Plots of CIM against effort scores indeed show a different relationship in 1990 than in the other two years. In 1990, high CIM scores were clustered in the mid-to-high range of effort scores. However, in 1995 and 2000, high CIM scores were distributed across most of the full range of effort scores.

<Table 9 About Here>

Table 9 shows a regression similar to those found in Table 8, but includes three factors we believe might plausibly be associated with effort but for which data were not systematically available prior to 2000; public health expenditures, private health expenditures, and general government consumption. Only private health expenditures are found to be reliably associated with government effort, such that countries with higher levels of private expenditure on health have lower government effort scores. This makes sense from a moral hazard framework, in that governments will back off spending if others are addressing important public health issues.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we introduced a methodology for the measurement of government effort to respect economic, social, and cultural rights. In doing so, we have encountered problems that seem to pervade the quantitative study of development and human rights. First, due to the Cold War-based split between civil and political rights on one side and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other, there is a dearth of consistent information regarding the degree to which states exert effort to respect the latter. Second, due to an unnecessary split between the concepts of development and economic, social, and cultural rights, many of the previous benchmarks have focused strictly on outcomes and accepted an increase in national wealth as a valid end in itself, regardless of whether a state's citizens benefitted from such an increase. As such, these measures have given us very little information about the degree to which states live up to their obligations in international law and, specifically, the ICESCR. Therefore, we set out to develop a methodology of measuring government effort that took these limitations into account and worked around them. Thus far, we are satisfied with our progress toward this goal.

In the development of this methodology, we found a third problem: even outcome measures are marred by large amounts of missing data and weak measures. The lack of reliable measures aimed at gauging the enjoyment of the rights to work, education, and equal pay for equal work is especially disappointing. While we are reasonably confident in the proxy indicators used to develop the measure described above, we do not see the measure developed in this paper as the perfect final measure that could be developed via our methodology. Rather, we see this measure as a reasonable proxy that could be used until these data become available. When these data are sufficiently available, it is our desire to create a more refined version of this measure using the same methodology, but based on stronger indicators of outcomes.

Still, there is no need to wait on the availability of these data before beginning the long task that awaits, i.e. developing an understanding of government respect for economic, social, and cultural rights that compares to the understanding that previous quantitative study has created regarding government respect for civil and political rights. With this goal in mind, we used the second half of this paper to jump start what we see as the next step in this endeavor: understanding the variance in government respect for economic, social, and cultural rights. It is our hope that future work will use the measure developed in this paper to further our understanding of which policies best convert government resources into the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights. In doing so, we hope to advance the quantitative study of human rights in such a way that we gain a better empirical understanding of that attribute of human rights that most human rights scholars already tacitly accept (Donnelly 2002), but have yet to empirically demonstrate: the universality, interdependence, and indivisibility of the entire list of internationally recognized human rights.

Table 1. Unrotated Principal Factor Analysis Loadings

	1990	**1995**	**2000**
PQLI	0.665	0.548	0.529
Women's Economic Rights	0.708	0.702	0.650
Workers' Rights	0.624	0.543	0.485

Table 2. Average Scores of Government Effort to Respect Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

	1990	**1995**	**2000**
World	.015	-.011	-.014
Std. Dev.	1.01	1.15	1.14
(N)	130	147	151
Africa	-.640	-.759	-.658
Std. Dev.	.714	.809	1.00
(N)	42	39	41
Asia	-.175	-.294	-.221
Std. Dev.	1.01	.922	1.18
(N)	34	44	45
Europe	.860	.986	.781
Std. Dev.	.802	1.08	.915
(N)	24	35	35
Latin America & the Caribbean	.452	.108	.221
Std. Dev.	.828	1.01	.896
(N)	24	23	24

Table 3. Global: Five Lowest and Highest Effort Scores; 1990, 1995, 2000

	1990		1995		2000
TOP 5					
Iceland	2.361	Iceland	3.257	Mongolia	3.289
Luxembourg	2.355	Luxembourg	2.808	Iceland	2.370
Belize	2.178	Ireland	2.796	Moldova	2.255
Greece	1.920	Hungary	2.763	Finland	2.158
Sri Lanka	1.868	Kyrgyz Republic	2.451	Estonia	2.151
BOTTOM 5					
Democratic Republic of Congo	-1.845	Kenya	-1.943	Pakistan	-2.416
Nigeria	-1.918	Burkina Faso	-2.067	Iraq	-2.528
Afghanistan	-2.060	Sudan	-2.179	Sudan	-2.529
Mali	-2.074	Pakistan	-2.399	Afghanistan	-2.982
India	-2.534	Chad	-2.441	Burkina Faso	-3.069

Table 4. Africa: Five Lowest and Highest Effort Scores; 1990, 1995, 2000

	1990		1995		2000
TOP 5					
Mauritius	1.079	Mauritius	1.301	Madagascar	1.522
Madagascar	0.977	Gabon	0.818	Namibia	1.498
Namibia	0.380	Mauritania	0.498	Tunisia	1.376
Swaziland	0.309	Namibia	0.446	Togo	0.911
Botswana	0.243	Tunisia	0.328	Mauritius	0.734
BOTTOM 5					
Kenya	-1.592	Uganda	-1.787	Tanzania	-1.724
Sudan	-1.720	Kenya	-1.943	Lesotho	-1.857
Congo, Democratic Republic	-1.845	Burkina Faso	-2.067	Kenya	-1.979
Nigeria	-1.918	Sudan	-2.179	Sudan	-2.529
Mali	-2.074	Chad	-2.441	Burkina Faso	-3.069

Table 5. Asia: Five Lowest and Highest Effort Scores; 1990, 1995, 2000

	1990		1995		2000
TOP 5					
Sri Lanka	1.868	Kyrgyz Republic	2.451	Mongolia	3.289
Mongolia	1.625	Tajikistan	1.774	Kyrgyz Republic	1.587
Cyprus	1.370	Mongolia	1.480	Cyprus	1.555
Turkey	1.264	Israel	0.915	United Arab Emirates	0.870
Vietnam	1.161	Taiwan	0.850	Philippines	0.767
BOTTOM 5					
Iraq	-1.190	Kuwait	-1.492	Iran	-2.059
Egypt	-1.202	Egypt	-1.513	Yemen	-2.296
Saudi Arabia	-1.679	Iran	-1.733	Pakistan	-2.416
Afghanistan	-2.060	Saudi Arabia	-1.828	Iraq	-2.528
India	-2.534	Pakistan	-2.399	Afghanistan	-2.982

Table 6. Europe: Five Lowest and Highest Effort Scores; 1990, 1995, 2000

	1990		1995		2000
TOP 5					
Iceland	2.361	Iceland	3.257	Iceland	2.370
Luxembourg	2.355	Luxembourg	2.808	Moldova	2.255
Greece	1.920	Ireland	2.796	Finland	2.158
Portugal	1.754	Hungary	2.763	Estonia	2.151
Hungary	1.669	Finland	2.307	Slovenia	2.142
BOTTOM 5					
Italy	0.060	Italy	-0.199	Belgium	-0.042
Bulgaria	0.015	Switzerland	-0.356	United Kingdom	-0.070
United Kingdom	-0.093	Spain	-0.528	Romania	-0.086
Belgium	-0.100	Russia	-0.594	Bulgaria	-0.652
France	-0.109	United Kingdom	-1.079	Russia	-1.589

Table 7. Latin America and the Caribbean: Five Lowest and Highest Effort Scores; 1990, 1995, 2000

	1990		1995		2000
TOP 5					
Belize	2.178	Belize	1.994	Panama	1.966
Trinidad and Tobago	1.802	Jamaica	1.827	Jamaica	1.893
Jamaica	1.792	Honduras	1.697	Trinidad and Tobago	1.618
Dominican Republic	1.466	Trinidad and Tobago	1.267	Costa Rica	1.291
Guyana	1.464	Costa Rica	1.137	Belize	0.932
BOTTOM 5					
Peru	-0.409	Peru	-0.939	Argentina	-0.492
Brazil	-0.483	Mexico	-0.999	Chile	-0.658
Mexico	-0.507	Haiti	-1.059	Colombia	-0.701
Guatemala	-0.535	Brazil	-1.187	Mexico	-1.049
Colombia	-0.726	Guyana	-1.525	Brazil	-1.294

Table 8. Beta Coefficients from a Regression Model Examining Some Possible Associates of Government Effort to Respect Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

	1990	1995	2000
ICESCR Status	.016 (0.85)	.100 (0.19)	-.047 (0.57)
Years under SAP	-.046 (0.63)	**-.302** (0.00)	**-.226** (0.01)
Military Spending	-.111 (0.24)	-.092 (0.29)	-.131 (0.11)
Respect for Physical Integrity Rights	**.259** (0.03)	**.187** (0.04)	**.319** (0.00)
Respect for Empowerment Rights	**.216** (0.08)	**.329** (0.00)	**.211** (0.04)
Population Size	**-.163** (0.05)	-.048 (0.53)	**-.154** (0.05)
Contract Intensive Money	**.209** (0.03)	.089 (0.26)	-.066 (0.44)
(N)	97	123	127
Prob > F	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the probability of making a Type-I error in rejecting H0 that there is no reliable association between a coefficient and government effort to respect ESCR.

Table 9. Beta Coefficients from a Regression Model Examining Some Possible Associates of Government Effort to Respect Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2000

	2000
ICESCR Status	-.032 (0.72)
Years under SAP	**-.200** (0.03)
Military Spending	-.128 (0.29)
Respect for Physical Integrity Rights	**.263** (0.01)
Respect for Empowerment Rights	**.255** (0.02)
Population Size	**-.128** (0.10)
Contract Intensive Money	-.143 (0.13)
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Public Health Expenditures	.034 (.80)
Private Health Expenditures	**-.198** (0.02)
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure	.026 (0.85)
(N)	122
Prob > F	0.00

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the probability of making a Type-I error in rejecting H0 that there is no reliable association between a coefficient and government effort to respect ESCR.

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APPENDIX: Estimation Results from Nonlinear Regressions

```
Iteration 18:  residual SS =  128.3989

      Source |       SS       df       MS            Number of obs =       125
-------------+------------------------------         F(  3,   121) =     19.17
       Model |  61.0371418     3  20.3457139         Prob > F      =    0.0000
    Residual |  128.398867   121  1.06114766         R-squared     =    0.3222
-------------+------------------------------         Adj R-squared =    0.3054
       Total |  189.436009   124  1.52770975         Root MSE      =   1.03012
                                                     Res. dev.     =  358.0881
4-parameter logistic function, ninetyfac=b0+b1/(1+exp(-b2*(logngo-b3)))
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   ninetyfac |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
          b0 |  -.6643081    .249526    -2.66   0.009    -1.158311   -.1703055
          b1 |   2.761058   .7753935     3.56   0.001     1.225962    4.296154
          b2 |   2.504946   1.249293     2.01   0.047     .0316409    4.978251
          b3 |   2.075611   .2401674     8.64   0.000     1.600137    2.551086
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Parameter b0 taken as constant term in model & ANOVA table
 (SEs, P values, CIs, and correlations are asymptotic approximations)


======================================================================================


Iteration 45:  residual SS =   178.374

      Source |       SS       df       MS            Number of obs =       142
-------------+------------------------------         F(  3,   138) =     12.55
       Model |  48.6622086     3  16.2207362         Prob > F      =    0.0000
    Residual |  178.374016   138  1.29256533         R-squared     =    0.2143
-------------+------------------------------         Adj R-squared =    0.1973
       Total |  227.036225   141  1.61018599         Root MSE      =   1.13691
                                                     Res. dev.     =  435.3624
4-parameter logistic function, ninetyfivefac=b0+b1/(1+exp(-b2*(logngo-b3)))
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ninetyfive~c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
          b0 |  -.3463109   .1551492    -2.23   0.027     -.653088   -.0395338
          b1 |   2.168958   .5806591     3.74   0.000     1.020819    3.317097
          b2 |    3.72281     2.1715     1.71   0.089    -.5709049    8.016525
          b3 |   2.195731   .2140395    10.26   0.000      1.77251    2.618952
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Parameter b0 taken as constant term in model & ANOVA table
 (SEs, P values, CIs, and correlations are asymptotic approximations)
```

APPENDIX: Estimation Results from Nonlinear Regressions, Contd.

```
Iteration 14:  residual SS =  193.0958

      Source |       SS       df       MS            Number of obs =       148
-------------+------------------------------         F(  3,   144) =     20.06
       Model |  80.6810982     3  26.8936994         Prob > F      =    0.0000
    Residual |  193.095775   144  1.34094288         R-squared     =    0.2947
-------------+------------------------------         Adj R-squared =    0.2800
       Total |  273.776873   147  1.86242771         Root MSE      =  1.157991
                                                     Res. dev.     =    459.37
4-parameter logistic function, twoaughtfac=b0+b1/(1+exp(-b2*(logngo-b3)))
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 twoaughtfac |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
          b0 |  -.7593697    .291791    -2.60   0.010    -1.336117   -.1826228
          b1 |   2.838664   .8292124     3.42   0.001     1.199664    4.477665
          b2 |   2.449406   1.251743     1.96   0.052    -.0247578    4.923569
          b3 |   2.010788   .2346715     8.57   0.000     1.546942    2.474634
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Parameter b0 taken as constant term in model & ANOVA table
 (SEs, P values, CIs, and correlations are asymptotic approximations)
```